A challenge to Moscow and Beijing: what lies ahead for US-Central Asia relations
The growing ties between the United States and Central Asia could put the region in a difficult position: either risk displeasing Russia and China, or disappoint Trump and fall into even greater dependence on Moscow and Beijing.
The strengthening of Central Asia’s relationship with the United States may remain at the level of empty promises. However, it could also present the region with a tough choice: either provoke dissatisfaction from its traditional allies, Russia and China, or disappoint President Trump and fall into even deeper reliance on the very same Moscow and Beijing.
The outcomes of the «Central Asia — USA» (C5+1) summit are analyzed by Temur Umarov, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Central Asia in the fall of 2025: Washington’s focus
In the trends of autumn 2025 in Washington, Central Asia is a key focus. If anyone thought that Donald Trump’s brief meetings with the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the agreements they signed worth billions of dollars, were insufficient evidence of the seriousness of the US’s intentions in the region, then the milestone C5+1 summit on November 6 should dispel those doubts.
For the first time in the history of their relations, all five Central Asian leaders and the US president gathered at the White House to celebrate a decade of cooperation in this format. For the heads of Central Asian states, this was either a rare trip (Emomali Rahmon last visited Washington in 2002, Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2018), or their very first visit to Washington as presidents.
Never before had the US been so convincing in trying to demonstrate to Central Asia that cooperation with America could offset the inevitable irritation of two powerful neighbors. The question is how effective this new approach will be, and whether it will fall apart when faced with the harsh realities, as happened with Trump’s attempt to stop the Russia-Ukraine war.
An Ideological Shift
Attention from Washington has always been a valuable asset for the leadership of post-Soviet countries. It adds weight on the international stage and underscores who is in charge within the country. This is especially important for Central Asian states, where Russia and China are only willing to take the US seriously, and not Europe, Turkey, or any other mid-level power.
Thus, Central Asia has always been ready to adjust to the American ideological agenda, even when Washington’s rhetoric about promoting democracy was far removed from the real priorities of Central Asian leaders. Moreover, when Trump himself began dismantling organizations that irritated local regimes, such as USAID, NED, and Radio Free Europe, it automatically guaranteed him the warmest support from the region’s leaders.
After that, nothing could have pushed Central Asian leaders away from the White House, whether it was the president’s vague understanding of the region or the tariffs he imposed (25% for Kazakhstan, 10% for others). On the contrary, the Central Asian presidents became even more active in adjusting to Washington’s new agenda, publicly criticizing organizations like Soros, NGOs, and climate change initiatives.
By Trump’s first year in office, this adaptation bore fruit. In September, the US president held a brief meeting with the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, and now he hosted the C5+1 summit with all five Central Asian heads of state in Washington.
Not quite a departure, but the same approach
While representatives of the Trump administration emphasize that their approach to Central Asia is fundamentally different from that of their predecessors, the main topics of this summit are quite similar to those of previous C5+1 meetings. Even the dialogue with the region on rare earth metals, which Trump called key, was initiated during Joe Biden’s presidency.
It was under Biden that the B5+1 business format was created to explore new investment opportunities, and C5+1 meetings were elevated to a presidential level—though these were held in New York, not the White House, as this one was.
Even the symbolism of the unprecedented first meeting at the White House was a little off. The official meeting lasted less than 40 minutes, half of which was spent on Trump’s responses to journalists' questions. The summit itself, the American side called only a «dinner.»
In other words, the foundation for the current rapprochement between the US and Central Asia was laid during Biden’s tenure, and Trump simply appears to be better at implementing these ideas because ideologically, he is much closer to the region’s leaders, who are eager to support his rhetoric about breakthroughs.
At the dinner, the Central Asian presidents competed to see who could best praise the American leader. The winner seemed to be Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who declared that Trump was «a great leader and statesman sent by the heavens to return common sense and traditions that we all share to US politics, both domestic and foreign.»
The strengthening of Central Asia’s relationship with the United States may remain at the level of empty promises. However, it could also present the region with a tough choice: either provoke dissatisfaction from its traditional allies, Russia and China, or disappoint President Trump and fall into even deeper reliance on the very same Moscow and Beijing.
The outcomes of the «Central Asia — USA» (C5+1) summit are analyzed by Temur Umarov, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Central Asia in the fall of 2025: Washington’s focus
In the trends of autumn 2025 in Washington, Central Asia is a key focus. If anyone thought that Donald Trump’s brief meetings with the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the agreements they signed worth billions of dollars, were insufficient evidence of the seriousness of the US’s intentions in the region, then the milestone C5+1 summit on November 6 should dispel those doubts.
For the first time in the history of their relations, all five Central Asian leaders and the US president gathered at the White House to celebrate a decade of cooperation in this format. For the heads of Central Asian states, this was either a rare trip (Emomali Rahmon last visited Washington in 2002, Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2018), or their very first visit to Washington as presidents.
Never before had the US been so convincing in trying to demonstrate to Central Asia that cooperation with America could offset the inevitable irritation of two powerful neighbors. The question is how effective this new approach will be, and whether it will fall apart when faced with the harsh realities, as happened with Trump’s attempt to stop the Russia-Ukraine war.
An Ideological Shift
Attention from Washington has always been a valuable asset for the leadership of post-Soviet countries. It adds weight on the international stage and underscores who is in charge within the country. This is especially important for Central Asian states, where Russia and China are only willing to take the US seriously, and not Europe, Turkey, or any other mid-level power.
Thus, Central Asia has always been ready to adjust to the American ideological agenda, even when Washington’s rhetoric about promoting democracy was far removed from the real priorities of Central Asian leaders. Moreover, when Trump himself began dismantling organizations that irritated local regimes, such as USAID, NED, and Radio Free Europe, it automatically guaranteed him the warmest support from the region’s leaders.
After that, nothing could have pushed Central Asian leaders away from the White House, whether it was the president’s vague understanding of the region or the tariffs he imposed (25% for Kazakhstan, 10% for others). On the contrary, the Central Asian presidents became even more active in adjusting to Washington’s new agenda, publicly criticizing organizations like Soros, NGOs, and climate change initiatives.
By Trump’s first year in office, this adaptation bore fruit. In September, the US president held a brief meeting with the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, and now he hosted the C5+1 summit with all five Central Asian heads of state in Washington.
Not quite a departure, but the same approach
While representatives of the Trump administration emphasize that their approach to Central Asia is fundamentally different from that of their predecessors, the main topics of this summit are quite similar to those of previous C5+1 meetings. Even the dialogue with the region on rare earth metals, which Trump called key, was initiated during Joe Biden’s presidency.
It was under Biden that the B5+1 business format was created to explore new investment opportunities, and C5+1 meetings were elevated to a presidential level—though these were held in New York, not the White House, as this one was.
Even the symbolism of the unprecedented first meeting at the White House was a little off. The official meeting lasted less than 40 minutes, half of which was spent on Trump’s responses to journalists' questions. The summit itself, the American side called only a «dinner.»
In other words, the foundation for the current rapprochement between the US and Central Asia was laid during Biden’s tenure, and Trump simply appears to be better at implementing these ideas because ideologically, he is much closer to the region’s leaders, who are eager to support his rhetoric about breakthroughs.
At the dinner, the Central Asian presidents competed to see who could best praise the American leader. The winner seemed to be Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who declared that Trump was «a great leader and statesman sent by the heavens to return common sense and traditions that we all share to US politics, both domestic and foreign.»
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